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The Influence of Accuracy as a
Function of Leader’s Bias:
The Role of Trustworthiness in the
Psychology of Procedural Justice
David De Cremer
Maastricht University
The present research examined the combined effect of accuracy of
procedures and leader’s bias on fairness judgments and the expe-
rience of positive emotions. The results of two studies showed that
the strongest positive effects on both types of reactions were found
when procedures were accurate and the leader was unbiased. In
addition, accuracy of procedures only revealed an impact when
the leader was perceived as unbiased rather than biased. More-
over, this interactive effect was found to be mediated, at least
partly, by perceptions of trustworthiness. These findings show
that more research is needed on examining different types of pro-
cedural fairness, both as single and combined predictors of peo-
ple’s reactions.
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Justice has been argued to have a profound effect on
people’s judgments and emotions across a variety of
social situations and interactions. In essence, since the
early writings of Plato and Socrates, researchers have
continuously been able to show how people use fairness
information to direct their actions, to assess how they
feel, to evaluate outcomes, and so forth. Of course, jus-
tice has many forms and a common approach has been
to classify two broad types of justice, that is, distributive
and procedural justice. Distributive justice refers to how
fair people evaluate the outcomes they receive (Deutsch,
1985), whereas procedural justice refers to the proce-
dures that are used to arrive at an outcome (Tyler, 1988).
Motivated by Lind and Tyler’s (1988, p. 1) argument that
fairness judgments are influenced more strongly by pro-
cedures than by outcomes, the past 15 years or so,
researchers have started to devote considerable atten-
tion to understand the psychology of procedural justice
in greater detail.
The procedures that authorities use may come in dif-
ferent forms and criteria. Indeed, Leventhal (1980) sug-
gested six procedural justice rules that people use to
evaluate the fairness of allocation decisions: consistency,
bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representa-
tiveness, and ethicality. These different types of proce-
dural rules have indeed been partly incorporated into
justice theories such as the group value model (Lind &
Tyler, 1988) (referring to voice, ethicality, and neutral-
ity) and recent developments of justice scales (see
Colquitt, 2001). However, it is fair to note that most of
this research has been correlational, and as such rela-
tively little causal or experimental evidence exists on
how all these different procedures affect people’s reac-
tions (see Van den Bos, 2001a, for the claim that more
experimental justice research is required).
In fact, to date, most experimental research has fo-
cused mainly on understanding the psychology of voice
(i.e., the possibility to provide input or not in decision-
making procedures) (Folger, 1977), and as a conse-
quence, experimental tests of the other procedural jus-
tice elements have been relatively limited. Indeed,
Brockner, Ackerman, and Fairchild (2001) recently
argued, “We know much more about the effects of, and
moderating influences on, process control and decision
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control, than we do about Leventhal et al.’s (1980) pro-
cedural elements of consistency, correctability and ac-
curacy. Future efforts need to redress this imbalance”
(p. 205). Thus, justice research also should experimen-
tally examine the effect of other procedural justice rules
on a variety of human reactions.
In addition to this shortcoming, however, it is maybe
even more important to note that hardly any research
has examined how the different procedural rules may
interact in determining people’s reactions. In complex
situations such as work settings, negotiations, and inter-
group relations, authorities make use of a range of pro-
cedures and do not stick to only one specific procedural
rule (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986). In fact, it may well
be that using one procedure may overrule the effective-
ness of another procedure, or it may be the case that dif-
ferent procedures enhance each other’s effectiveness.
For these reasons, it is necessary to examine how dif-
ferent procedural rules interact in influencing people’s
reactions. The purpose of the present research is two-
fold. First, I wish to experimentally examine the validity
and effectiveness of other procedural rules than the
widely used manipulation of voice (cf. Brockner et al.,
2001). Second, because it is important and necessary to
examine how procedures interact, I will examine the
combined effects of two different procedural rules. The
procedures that will be addressed in the present re-
search are accuracy and leader’s bias.
Procedural Justice: Accuracy and Leader’s Bias
The construct of procedural justice has received con-
siderable attention throughout the past two decades, but
as said before, the focus on the different procedural
rules has remained largely limited to the concept of
voice. In fact, the pioneering work on “process-control-
effect” by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and the “voice-
effect” by Folger (1977) has, throughout the years,
resulted in an impressive number of experiments in
which procedural fairness was manipulated by allowing
people voice or not (see, e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Lind,
Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Van den Bos, 1999), and it can be
concluded that voice is now the most accepted and most
frequently used manipulation of procedural fairness
(e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Van den Bos, Vermunt, &
Wilke, 1996). In essence, these studies show that voice,
relative to no voice, leads to increased procedural fair-
ness perceptions (e.g., McFarlin & Sweeney, 1996),
better decision making (e.g., Lind et al., 1990), effective
goal setting (e.g., Early & Lind, 1987), and positive out-
come fairness judgments (e.g., Van den Bos, Wilke,
Lind, & Vermunt, 1998).
However, I wish to argue that it is time to experimen-
tally examine some of the other procedural rules as iden-
tified by Leventhal (1980), both separately and in tan-
dem. One procedure that is considered to be of major
importance within groups and organizations is accuracy.
Indeed, when recruiting prospective group members or
employees, accurate procedures are a necessary tool to
promote the procedural fairness of the recruitment
questionnaires and tests (e.g., Gilliland, 1994). In addi-
tion, accuracy is also one of the alternative procedures
that has been the focus of some experimental social jus-
tice studies, although the number of these kind of stud-
ies has been limited (see, e.g., Van den Bos, 2001b; Van
den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Vermunt, Wit, Van
den Bos, & Lind, 1996). Accuracy refers to the extent to
which authorities base their decisions on all the informa-
tion they receive or only on part of it. Indeed, in experi-
mental studies using this type of manipulation, partici-
pants are usually informed that their performance on a
task or an assessment will be checked either in an accu-
rate manner (i.e., all items will be evaluated to reach a
decision) or inaccurate manner (i.e., only some items
will be evaluated to reach a decision). Moreover, using
these techniques, studies have shown that manipulations
of procedural accuracy affect the same range of people’s
reactions as do manipulations of voice, adding validity to
the perspective of accuracy as an important procedural
rule (cf. Van den Bos et al., 1997).
Furthermore, a key impediment to accuracy is consid-
ered to be the extent to which an authority is biased
(Tyler & Lind, 1992), or the procedure that Leventhal
referred to as bias suppression. Bias suppression refers to
the event that authorities are not prejudiced and that
they act on the basis of a complete and open assessment
of the facts, accentuating its relationship to accurate
judgments. This concept of bias also figures prominently
in assumptions made by the relational model of author-
ity (Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992). According to this
model, procedural justice influences a range of variables
such as self-esteem, emotions, and cooperation because
it communicates important relational concerns. One
such relational concern is referred to as neutrality or the
lack of bias in decision-making procedures. Thus, follow-
ing these justice theories, bias is supposed to constitute
an important aspect of procedural rules. For example,
within courtrooms, judges are needed that suppress
biases to remain neutral toward attorneys and their cli-
ents. Indeed, recent research by Clay-Warner (2001)
demonstrated the importance of procedural justice in
detecting biases toward female attorneys (by both
female and male judges) in the courtroom. Further-
more, Lind, Tyler, and Huo (1997) also demonstrated
that neutrality or bias suppression is the most important
determinant of shaping procedural fairness in dyadic
conflict resolutions.
To date, little experimental research exists examining
accuracy and bias as important procedural rules and, as
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such, the applicability of the main justice findings re-
mains mainly limited to the voice manipulation. In addi-
tion, however, what is even more important is to examine
how the different operationalizations of procedural jus-
tice may interact in determining important reactions
toward (in)justice such as fairness evaluations and emo-
tions. Indeed, more than two decades ago, Leventhal
(1980) already proposed that procedural justice was a
function of the extent to which a number of procedural
rules were satisfied or violated. In other words, to more
fully understand the psychology of procedural justice,
we need to look at how people react toward authorities
using a range of different procedures. Because manag-
ers and authorities make use of a variety of decision-
making procedures, it is proposed in the present
research that the effects of accuracy and bias will be
strongest in conjunction rather than on their own
(Hypothesis 1). As mentioned earlier, accuracy and bias
are considered to be key rules for procedural justice to
emerge (Leventhal, 1980), and, therefore, the combina-
tion of the two identified procedural rules should have
stronger effects than the simple impact of each of these
components (see also Skarlicki & Folger, 1997, for
correlational evidence that a combination of different
dimensions of justice may reveal stronger effects).
To elaborate further, before people engage in selec-
tion assessments or evaluations of all kind, they often
have a certain image about the authority. More precise,
due to rumors, gossip, or other types of information,
people within groups and organizations often have an
idea about whether the authority is biased (e.g., Kurlan
& Pelled, 2000). Thus, because perceptions of authori-
ties’ bias often precede the action that those authorities
undertake (cf. Van den Bos et al., 1997), some other pre-
dictions can be made as well; that is, if people are aware
that the authority is biased or nonbiased, to what extent
will this influence the effect of accuracy? In other words,
when can we expect to have the accuracy manipulation
to reveal the strongest effect (i.e., accuracy effect)?
It is likely that in this process, trust may provide us
with an explanation. In general, trust can be defined as
“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions
of another party based on the expectations that the
other will perform a particular action important to the
trustor” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 712).
Thus, in the present context, trust refers to the belief
that the authority will not exploit us and will make good
decisions in the future. To reinforce this belief, and as
such to install trust, people will therefore draw infer-
ences from information that is available (see Van den
Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998), in this case, the extent to
which the authority is biased or not. This assumption
aligns well with the relational model of authority (Tyler,
1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992), which assumes that people
care about the benevolence of the authority and will
therefore assign much weight to how neutral the author-
ity acts. In fact, Tyler and Degoey (1996) explicitly note
that “trustworthiness is primarily determined by neutral
and unbiased decision making” (p. 342). Such degree of
trust elicited by the procedural element of bias will then
serve as the basis for people to base their judgments and
other types of reactions on (e.g., Brockner et al., 2001).
Following from this, it may be the case that biased
authorities are expected to have bad intentions and
therefore are not perceived as benevolent. As a result,
due to this negative image (i.e., in terms of distrust), the
subsequent actions or decisions of a biased authority will
not be taken into account anymore because it is clear
that the relationship with the authority is negative. In
contrast, if people perceive the authority as unbiased,
they will not distrust the authority and, following the
relational model of authority, will be motivated to use
the subsequent actions and procedures of the authority
to make further inferences about the quality of their
relationship with this authority (Tyler, 1999, 2001).
Taken together, the above leads me to predict that accu-
racy will not influence people’s reactions if they know
that the authority is biased. In contrast, if the authority is
not biased, accuracy will influence people’s reactions
(Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, I predict that this interac-
tion effect will be mediated by perceptions of trustwor-
thiness (Hypothesis 3). Indeed, because without evi-
dence of authorities’ trustworthiness other procedural
justice elements such as accuracy will become less impor-
tant or not important at all, it follows that this process of
trust in the authority determines whether we put weight
on subsequent procedural dimensions enacted by the
authority to influence our judgments and other types of
reactions.
EXPERIMENT 1
The first study was a scenario experiment set out to
provide a first test of my hypotheses. Accuracy was
manipulated by using an established manipulation of
Vermunt et al. (1996; see also Van den Bos, 2001b). In
this manipulation, the authority makes a decision on
how well or how poor the other performed by either
evaluating all the items that the other person filled out
(i.e., accurate) or by only evaluating one item (i.e., inac-
curate). This manipulation has been used successfully
and has revealed effects similar to the procedure of voice
on justice-related variables such as fairness judgments,
self-esteem, and affect. Authority’s bias was manipu-
lated by describing that—based on participant’s own
experiences—the authority was seen as a biased or un-
biased person.
The main dependent variables were procedural fair-
ness judgments, perceptions of trustworthiness, and
De Cremer / ACCURACY, BIAS, AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 295
emotional reactions. Whereas judgments of fairness and
perceptions of trustworthiness are quite common in jus-
tice research, assessments of emotions have largely been
neglected. Indeed, Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano
(1999) even argue that “the relative lack of empirical
research assessing emotional reactions to conditions of
unfairness is a serious omission” (p. 786, see also
Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000). Therefore, because jus-
tice can be seen as an affective event, it is necessary and
important to assess how people react in an emotional
manner toward procedural justice (Tyler & Smith,
1998).
To date, most justice studies including emotional
reactions have used negative affect measures because
injustice is believed to elicit feelings of anger and resent-
ment (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Indeed, Mikula,
Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998), for example, state that
in case of justice studies, “in about 50% of cases a mem-
ber of the anger family is likely to be elicited” (p. 781).
However, they go on to notice that “objectively simi-
lar situations can produce widely different emotions”
(p. 781), suggesting that a wide range of emotions differ-
ing in specificity and valence needs to be measured.
Therefore, in the present research, I will follow such
an approach and rather than assessing negative emo-
tions I will assess participants’ positive emotional reac-
tions. Contrary to distributive justice research (see, e.g.,
Austin & Walster, 1974; Sprecher, 1986), prior proce-
dural justice research has revealed surprisingly little evi-
dence that procedures also influence people’s positive
emotional reactions; therefore, more research on the
relationship between procedural fairness and positive
emotions is required. Moreover, because the literature
on emotions has convincingly argued that in addition to
negative emotions also positive emotions need to be
assessed to fully understand the effect of social cues on
emotions (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), Experi-
ment 1 will use positive emotions as a dependent mea-
sure (see also Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002, for a recent
study assessing this type of emotions).
Method
Participants and design. Seventy-one undergraduate
students at Maastricht University participated volun-
tarily in this first study. They were each paid 2 euros
(approximately U.S.$2) and were randomly allocated to
a 2 (procedural bias: biased vs. unbiased) × 2 (accuracy:
accurate vs. nonaccurate) between-subjects factorial
design.
Experimental procedure. Participants were approached
by a female research assistant at several locations within
the psychology department and were asked whether they
were willing to fill out a questionnaire containing the
scenario study. The total study lasted for 15 min.
In the scenario, participants were asked to imagine
the following situation:
For some time now, you have worked for a company
called MicroMac that specializes in buying and selling
computer equipment. After a while, you participate in
an internal selection procedure to acquire a higher posi-
tion within this company. Therefore, you will have to fol-
low a specific procedure. More specifically, your supervi-
sor will use a procedure consisting of nine different
parts: an intelligence test, a personality test, a mathemat-
ical test, a test measuring your technical skills, a test
assessing calculation skills, a language test, a test measur-
ing your demographical skills, a motivation test, and
finally, an interview with your supervisor. Due to your
work specifics, you need to collaborate quite often with
your supervisor. After this selection procedure, your
supervisor will decide whether you will be promoted.
This was followed by the manipulation of procedural
bias. In the biased procedure condition, participants
read the following:
Following conversations with others and your own daily
observations, you know that your supervisor is a biased
person. He will often make decisions that are solely in
favor of his own interests and not in favor of the interest
of others. For example, you know that he may promote
someone just because the company wishes to promote
other people.
In the unbiased procedure condition, participants read
the following:
Following conversations with others and your own daily
observations, you know that your supervisor is an unbi-
ased person. He will never make decisions that are favor-
ing solely his own interests, although not necessarily
favoring those of others. For example, you know that he
will never refuse to promote someone just because the
company wishes to promote someone else.
Then, the accuracy manipulation was introduced
(which was validated by and taken from Vermunt et al.,
1996). In the accurate condition, participants read the
following: “A week after you complete all the tests, you
are told that your supervisor has graded all the nine parts
of the selection procedure (and based on this will make a
decision).” In the inaccurate condition, participants
read, “A week after you did all the tests, you are told that
your supervisor has only graded one of the nine parts of
the selection procedure (and based on this will make a
decision).”
Thereafter, the dependent measures of this study
were solicited. To measure the trustworthiness of the
supervisor, participants were asked to what extent they
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considered their supervisor to be trustworthy. Proce-
dural fairness judgments were assessed by means of
three items: To what extent “do you consider your super-
visor to be honest,” “does your supervisor act in a fair
way,” and “do you think your supervisor uses this selec-
tion procedure in a just way.” These three items were
combined to form one average procedural fairness score
(Cronbach’s α = .94). Finally, to assess the effect of our
manipulations on emotions, participants were asked
how satisfied and happy they would be about the way
they were treated by their supervisor (r = .83, p < .001).
All questions were answered on 7-point scales (ranging
from not at all = 1 to very much so = 7).
Results
Trustworthiness. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the average proce-
dural fairness score revealed, first, a significant main
effect of procedural bias, F(1, 67) = 47.42, p < .001, η2 =
.41: Participants in the unbiased condition evaluated the
supervisor as more trustworthy than those in the biased
condition (Ms = 4.56 vs. 2.54, SDs = 1.59 and 1.31, re-
spectively). Also, a significant main effect for accuracy
was found, F(1, 67) = 23.45, p < .001, η2 = .26: An accurate
supervisor was evaluated as more trustworthy than an
inaccurate supervisor (Ms = 4.26 vs. 2.84, SDs = 1.82
and 1.40, respectively). Finally, a significant interac-
tion effect emerged, F(1, 67) = 6.63, p < .05, η2 = .09 (see
Table 1).
In line with Hypothesis 1, the means reported in
Table 1 show that perceptions of trustworthiness were
indeed highest in the unbiased/high-accuracy condi-
tion and this cell was significantly different from the
other cells. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2, planned
comparisons were calculated. As expected, the accuracy
effect was significant in the unbiased condition, F(1, 69)
= 14.67, p < .001, η2 = .17, but not in the biased condition,
F(1, 69) = 1.98, p < .17, η2 = .02. Furthermore, the effect
of procedural bias was significantly stronger within the
accurate conditions, F(1, 69) = 29.69, p < .001, η2 = .30,
than within the inaccurate conditions, F(1, 69) = 5.16, p <
.05, η2 = .07.
Procedural fairness judgments. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the
average procedural fairness score revealed, first, a signif-
icant main effect of procedural bias, F(1, 67) = 38.02, p <
.001, η2 = .36: Participants in the biased condition evalu-
ated the leader as less fair than those in the unbiased
condition (Ms = 2.36 vs. 3.95, SDs = 1.42 and 1.88, respec-
tively). Also, a significant main effect for accuracy was
found, F(1, 67) = 90.38, p < .001, η2 = .57: An accurate
supervisor was evaluated as much fairer than an inaccu-
rate supervisor (Ms = 4.37 vs. 1.93, SDs = 1.69 and 1.00,
respectively). Finally, a significant interaction effect
emerged, F(1, 67) = 8.72, p < .005, η2 = .11 (see Table 1).
In line with Hypothesis 1, the means reported in
Table 1 show that perceptions of procedural fairness
were indeed highest in the unbiased/high-accuracy con-
dition, and this cell was significantly different from the
other cells. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2, planned
comparisons were calculated. As expected, the accuracy
effect was significant more strongly in the unbiased con-
dition, F(1, 69) = 39.65, p < .001, η2 = .36, than in the
biased condition, F(1, 69) = 9.45, p < .005, η2 = .12. Fur-
thermore, the effect of procedural bias was significant
within the accurate conditions, F(1, 69) = 17.58, p < .001,
η2 = .20, but not within the inaccurate conditions, F(1,
69) = 1.93, p = .17, η2 = .02.
Positive emotions. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the average proce-
dural fairness score revealed, first, a significant main
effect of procedural bias, F(1, 67) = 36.30, p < .001, η2 =
.35: Participants in the unbiased condition reported
higher positive emotions than did those in the biased
condition (Ms = 4.00 vs. 2.38, SDs = 1.71 and 1.25, respec-
tively). Also, a significant main effect for accuracy was
found, F(1, 67) = 50.72, p < .001, η2 = .43: An accurate
supervisor elicited higher positive emotions than an
inaccurate supervisor (Ms = 4.14 vs. 2.23, SDs = 1.67 and
1.11, respectively). Finally, a significant interaction effect
emerged, F(1, 67) = 5.28, p < .05, η2 = .07 (see Table 1).
In line with Hypothesis 1, the means reported in
Table 1 show that the experience of positive emotions
was indeed highest in the unbiased/high-accuracy con-
dition and that this cell was significantly different from
the other cells. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2, planned
comparisons were calculated. As expected, the accuracy
effect was significantly stronger within the unbiased con-
ditions, F(1, 69) = 24.65, p < .001, η2 = .26, than in the
biased conditions, F(1, 69) = 6.65, p < .05, η2 = .08. Fur-
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TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Trustworthiness, Pro-
cedural Fairness, and Positive Emotions as a Function of
Procedural Bias and Accuracy (Experiment 1)
Procedural Bias
Dependent Variables Accuracy Biased Unbiased
Trustworthiness Accurate 2.87b (1.40) 5.64c (0.93)
Inaccurate 2.21a (1.18) 3.47b (1.34)
Procedural fairness Accurate 3.20c (1.44) 5.54d (0.97)
Inaccurate 1.52a (0.85) 2.35b (0.99)
Positive emotions Accurate 3.03b (1.29) 5.26c (1.20)
Inaccurate 1.73a (0.88) 2.73b (1.12)
NOTE: Numbers are means on 7-point scales, with higher values indi-
cating higher ratings of fairness, positive emotions, and trustworthi-
ness; numbers within parentheses are standard deviations. Means with
a different subscript differ significantly at p < .05.
thermore, the procedural bias effect was significant
within the accurate conditions, F(1, 69) = 18.84, p < .001,
η2 = .21, and marginally significant within the inaccurate
conditions, F(1, 69) = 3.39, p = .07, η2 = .04.
Mediational analysis. To test whether perceptions of
trustworthiness are indeed the process via which the
interaction between procedural bias and accuracy exerts
influence on procedural fairness judgments and positive
emotions (Hypothesis 3), I conducted a series of regres-
sion analyses (see Baron & Kenny, 1986). To test for
mediation, four steps need to be taken. First, the effect of
the independent variable on the dependent variable has
to be significant. Second, the proposed mediating vari-
able has to influence significantly the dependent vari-
able. Third, the independent variable has to influence
significantly the mediating variable. Fourth, the effect
of the independent variable on the dependent variable
has to be reduced when accounting for the mediating
variable.
Procedural fairness judgments. A first regression analysis
on procedural fairness judgments revealed significant
main effects of accuracy, β = –.66, p < .001, and bias, β =
.41, p < .001, and a significant interaction effect, β = –.90,
p < .005, as such paralleling the ANOVA results. A second
regression analysis revealed that trustworthiness signifi-
cantly influenced procedural fairness judgments, β = .80,
p < .001. A third regression analysis on the trustworthi-
ness score revealed significant main effects of accuracy,
β = –.40, p < .001, and bias, β = .56, p < .001, and a signifi-
cant interaction effect, β = –.94, p < .001, also paralleling
the ANOVA results. Finally, a regression analysis includ-
ing trustworthiness as a covariate revealed that the inter-
action between accuracy and bias disappeared, β = –.40,
p = .11. A calculation of the Sobel test showed that this
reduction in beta weight was significant, z = –2.38, p < .05.
Positive emotions. A first regression analysis on positive
emotions revealed significant main effects of accuracy,
β = –.56, p < .001, and bias, β = .46, p < .001, and a signifi-
cant interaction effect, β = –.80, p < .005, also paralleling
the ANOVA results. A second regression analysis
revealed that trustworthiness significantly influenced
positive emotions, β = .82, p < .001. Finally, a regression
analysis including trustworthiness as a covariate revealed
that the interaction between accuracy and bias disap-
peared, β = –.23, p = .42. A calculation of the Sobel test
showed that this reduction in beta weight was significant,
z = –2.40, p < .05.
EXPERIMENT 2
As expected, the results of Experiment 1 supported
the predictions. The strongest effects were obtained
when the authority was unbiased and accurate. Further-
more, accuracy only influenced people’s reactions when
the authority was perceived as unbiased. Finally, this
effect was mediated by perceptions of trustworthiness. As
such, the present findings contribute significantly to the
validity of these two procedural rules and also suggest
that both are necessary to obtain the best results. How-
ever, before drawing strong conclusions, we need to rep-
licate these findings.
Indeed, Experiment 1 made use of a scenario in
which participants were asked to imagine a relevant work
situation. One might wonder whether similar results will
be obtained when participants are involved in an actual
working task where an authority will evaluate perfor-
mances. Therefore, in Experiment 2, an experimental
laboratory study was conducted in which participants
were placed in a real interaction setting. Accuracy was
again manipulated by using Vermunt et al.’s (1996) op-
erationalization. Procedural bias was manipulated by
creating a belief among participants that the authority
would be prejudiced or not when evaluating the perfor-
mance of each participant. This perception of prejudice
was based on the scores of each participant on a test that
would measure the skills required for the upcoming per-
formance task.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and four under-
graduate students participated voluntarily in the pres-
ent study and were each paid 10 euros (approximately
U.S.$10). They were randomly assigned to a 2 (proce-
dural bias: biased vs. unbiased) × 2 (accuracy: accurate
vs. inaccurate) between-subjects factorial design.
Experimental procedure. After arriving at the laboratory,
participants were placed in an experimental cubicle con-
taining a table, a chair, and a computer. Participants
were led to believe that all interactions and communica-
tions would take place via the computer (which was
believed to be connected to a general server). After par-
ticipating in an unrelated task, participants were in-
formed that they would have to do a task in which they
could earn additional money that, in turn, could be used
in a subsequent negotiation study. Before starting with
this task, however, participants were told that they first
would have to fill out a questionnaire. It was said that this
questionnaire was developed to assess several qualities
that are important with respect to the task that the par-
ticipants would have to do later on in the study. Partici-
pants were further told that the score on this question-
naire provides a good impression about how people
would perform on tasks such as the one that the par-
ticipants would have to do. Thus, participants first had
to fill out the questionnaire and thereafter the task
would be explained. After this, participants filled out the
questionnaire.
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Then, the task was explained. Each participant would
receive four word tasks that each of them had to solve
individually. The task was introduced as an analogical
reasoning task. For each of the four trials, participants
were first presented three words and were asked to think
which word these three words would have in common;
that is, which word would be related to the three other
words? Combining these four words should then result
in a short sentence.
After explaining this task, the procedural bias manip-
ulation was introduced. In the biased condition, partici-
pants were sent an e-mail saying that the experimenter
would assign much weight to the participant’s score on
the questionnaire. It was the experimenter’s belief that
people’s scores on the questionnaire would already indi-
cate their performance on the subsequent task (and thus
not much attention had to be devoted to the actual per-
formance). The experimenter clearly emphasized that
he would make use of the test scores to evaluate and ana-
lyze the performance of each participant on the word
task, even if this would make him seem biased by the
questionnaire scores. Thus, participants were led to
believe that a bad score would lead the experimenter to
think in advance that they would not do well on the task.
In the unbiased condition, participants were sent an e-
mail saying that the experimenter would not assign too
much weight to the participant’s score on the question-
naire. It was the experimenter’s belief that he first had to
evaluate the performance of the participant on the task
and then, if necessary, he could use the questionnaire
scores as well. The experimenter clearly said that mainly
using the questionnaire scores to evaluate the perfor-
mances would make him too biased. Thus, participants
were led to believe that a bad score would not lead the
experimenter to take for granted that they would not do
well on the task.
After reading this e-mail, participants started with the
four word tasks. After finishing the task, the accuracy
manipulation was introduced. In the accurate proce-
dure, the experimenter said that before making a final
decision, he would check all the tasks that the partici-
pant fulfilled; that is, all four tasks would be evaluated. In
the inaccurate procedure, the experimenter said that
before making a final decision, he would not check all
the tasks that the participant fulfilled; that is, he would
only evaluate one out of four tasks.
Then, the dependent measures of Study 2 were solic-
ited. All questions were answered on 7-point scales
(ranging from not at all = 1 to very much so = 7). To check
the effectiveness of the procedural bias manipulation,
participants were asked two questions: (a) “To what
extent do you think the experimenter is biased?” and (b)
“To what extent will the experimenter base his evalua-
tions on your questionnaire scores (rather than on your
actual performance)?” Furthermore, to check for the
effectiveness of the accuracy manipulation, participants
were asked to what extent they considered the experi-
menter to be accurate in his evaluations. Then, partici-
pants’ perceptions of trustworthiness were assessed by
asking them to what extent they considered “the experi-
menter to be trustworthy” and “the experimenter to
show reliable behavior” (r = .71, p < .001). Thereafter,
perceptions of fairness were assessed by asking them to
what extent “they perceived the experimenter to be
just,” “they perceived the experimenter to be fair,” and
“the procedures and the attitude of the experimenter
were fair” (Cronbach’s α = .89). Finally, participants’
emotional reactions were measured by asking them
how satisfied and angry (reverse scored) they were (r =
.29, p < .005). Finally, participants were debriefed, paid,
thanked, and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation check. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the accuracy
question revealed that participants in the accurate pro-
cedure condition perceived the experimenter to be
more accurate in his evaluation than were those in the
inaccurate condition (Ms = 4.75 vs. 3.48, SDs = 1.23 and
1.88, respectively), F(1, 100) = 21.04, p < .001, η2 = .17. No
main effect of procedural bias, F(1, 100) < 1, ns, or an
interaction, F(1, 100) < 1, ns, was found.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the first bias check question
revealed that participants in the biased procedure condi-
tion perceived the experimenter to be more biased than
those in the unbiased condition (Ms = 4.82 vs. 3.88, SDs =
1.22 and 1.54, respectively), F(1, 100) = 11.79, p = .001,
η2 = .10. No main effect of accuracy, F(1, 100) < 1, ns, or
an interaction, F(1, 100) < 1, ns, was found.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the second bias question revealed
that participants in the biased procedure condition
thought to a greater extent that the experimenter would
evaluate each person more on the basis of his or her
questionnaire score rather than on his or her actual per-
formance than did those in the unbiased condition
(Ms = 4.50 vs. 3.57, SDs = 1.23 and 1.47, respectively), F(1,
100) = 11.80, p = .001, η2 = .10. No main effect of accuracy,
F(1, 100) < 1, ns, or an interaction, F(1, 100) < 1, ns, was
found. These analyses show that the manipulations were
successful.
Trustworthiness. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the average trust-
worthiness score revealed, first, a significant main effect
of accuracy, F(1, 100) = 12.02, p = .001, η2 = .10: An accu-
rate supervisor was evaluated as more trustworthy than
an inaccurate supervisor (Ms = 4.33 vs. 3.50, SDs = 1.32
and 1.16, respectively). Also, a marginal significant inter-
action effect emerged, F(1, 100) = 3.21, p < .08, η2 = .03
(see Table 2).
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In line with Hypothesis 1, the means reported in
Table 1 show that perceptions of trustworthiness were
indeed highest in the unbiased/high-accuracy condi-
tion and this cell was significantly different from the
other cells. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2, planned
comparisons were calculated. As expected, the accuracy
effect was significant when the supervisor was not biased,
F(1, 102) = 13.68, p < .001, η2 = .12, but not when the
supervisor was biased, F(1, 102) = 1.24, p < .27, η2 = .01.
Furthermore, the effect of procedural bias was signifi-
cant within the accurate conditions, F(1, 102) = 4.39, p <
.05, η2 = .04, but not within the inaccurate conditions,
F(1, 102) < 1, ns, η2 = .00.
Procedural fairness judgments. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the
average procedural fairness score revealed, first, a signif-
icant main effect of procedural bias, F(1, 100) = 4.04, p <
.05, η2 = .04: Participants in the biased condition evalu-
ated the experimenter as less fair than did those in the
unbiased condition (Ms = 3.71 vs. 4.18, SDs = 1.29 and
1.26, respectively). Also, a significant main effect for
accuracy was found, F(1, 100) = 14.25, p < .001, η2 = .12:
An accurate supervisor was evaluated as fairer than an
inaccurate supervisor (Ms = 4.39 vs. 3.51, SDs = 1.34 and
1.09, respectively). Finally, a significant interaction
effect emerged, F(1, 100) = 4.98, p < .05, η2 = .05 (see
Table 2).
In line with Hypothesis 1, the means reported in
Table 2 show that perceptions of procedural fairness
were indeed highest in the unbiased/high-accuracy con-
dition and this cell was significantly different from the
other cells. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2, planned
comparisons were calculated. As expected, the accuracy
effect was significant when the supervisor was not biased,
F(1, 102) = 17.49, p < .001, η2 = .15, but not when the
supervisor was biased, F(1, 102) < 1, ns, η2 = .01. Further-
more, the effect of procedural bias was significant within
the accurate conditions, F(1, 100) = 8.04, p < .01, η2 = .07,
but not within the inaccurate conditions, F(1, 100) < 1,
ns, η2 = .00.
Positive emotions. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the average posi-
tive emotion score revealed, first, a marginal signifi-
cant main effect of procedural bias, F(1, 100) = 2.79, p <
.10, η2 = .02: Participants in the unbiased condition expe-
rienced higher positive emotions than did those in the
biased condition (Ms = 4.34 vs. 3.98, SDs = 1.18 and 1.13,
respectively). Also, a significant main effect of accuracy
was found, F(1, 100) = 4.46, p < .05, η2 = .04: Participants
experienced higher positive emotions in the accurate
condition than in the inaccurate condition (Ms = 4.39 vs.
3.51, SDs = 1.17 and 1.12, respectively). Finally, a signifi-
cant interaction effect emerged, F(1, 100) = 6.07, p < .05,
η2 = .05 (see Table 2).
In line with Hypothesis 1, the means reported in
Table 2 show that the experience of positive emotions
was indeed highest in the unbiased/high-accuracy con-
dition and this cell was significantly different from the
other cells. Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 2, planned
comparisons were calculated. As expected, the accuracy
effect was significant when the supervisor was not biased,
F(1, 102) = 10.38, p < .005, η2 = .07, but not when the
supervisor was biased, F(1, 102) < 1, ns, η2 = .00. Further-
more, the effect of procedural bias was significant within
the accurate conditions, F(1, 102) = 8.33, p = .005, η2 =
.07, but not within the inaccurate conditions, F(1, 100) <
1, ns, η2 = .00.
Mediational analysis. Again, to test whether percep-
tions of trustworthiness underlie the predicted interac-
tion effects on procedural fairness judgments and posi-
tive emotions (Hypothesis 3), I conducted a series of
regression analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The same
procedure as in Experiment 1 was followed.
Procedural fairness judgments. A first regression analysis
on procedural fairness judgments revealed significant
main effects of accuracy, β = –.34, p < .001, and bias, β =
.18, p = .05, and a significant interaction effect, β = –.87,
p < .05, as such paralleling the ANOVA results. A second
regression analysis revealed that trustworthiness signifi-
cantly influenced procedural fairness judgments, β = .80,
p < .001. A third regression analysis on the trustworthi-
ness score revealed a significant main effect of accuracy,
β = –.32, p = .001, and a marginal significant interaction
effect, β = –.72, p < .08, also paralleling the ANOVA re-
sults. Finally, a regression analysis including trustworthi-
ness as covariate revealed that the interaction between
accuracy and bias disappeared, β = –.33, p < .20. A calcu-
lation of the Sobel test showed that this reduction in beta
weight was marginally significant, z = –1.77, p < .08.
Positive emotions. A first regression analysis on positive
emotions revealed a significant main effect of accuracy,
β = –.19, p < .05, a marginal significant effect of bias, β =
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TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Procedural Fairness,
Positive Emotions, and Trustworthiness as a Function of
Procedural Bias and Accuracy (Experiment 2)
Procedural Bias
Dependent Variables Accuracy Biased Unbiased
Procedural fairness Accurate 3.89a (1.49) 4.88b (0.95)
Inaccurate 3.53a (1.06) 3.48a (1.15)
Positive emotions Accurate 3.94a (1.24) 4.84b (0.92)
Inaccurate 4.01a (1.04) 3.84a (1.21)
Trustworthiness Accurate 3.96a (1.42) 4.71b (1.12)
Inaccurate 3.55a (1.08) 3.44a (1.26)
NOTE: Numbers are means on 7-point scales, with higher values indi-
cating higher ratings of fairness, positive emotions, and trustworthi-
ness; numbers within parentheses are standard deviations. Means with
a different subscript differ significantly at p < .05.
.15, p = .10, and a significant interaction effect, β = –1.00,
p < .05, as such paralleling the ANOVA results. A second
regression analysis revealed that trustworthiness signifi-
cantly influenced positive emotions, β = .60, p < .001.
Finally, a regression analysis including trustworthiness as
covariate revealed that the significant interaction
between accuracy and bias disappeared, β = –.59, p < .09.
A calculation of the Sobel test showed that this reduc-
tion in beta weight was marginally significant, z = –1.73,
p < .09.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the present findings are supportive of
the predictions. Both studies showed that it is useful for
justice studies to examine interactions between different
procedural rules to unravel further why procedural jus-
tice should matter in influencing a range of reactions,
including fairness perceptions, trust perceptions, and
emotions. In addition, the analyses also provided in-
sights in the underlying mechanisms of the interactive
effect of accuracy and bias. In the following paragraphs,
the most important implications will be discussed.
The main finding of the present research concerns
the interaction between procedural bias and accuracy.
Consistent across two studies, procedural bias and accu-
racy had stronger effects on a variety of human reactions
in conjunction rather than on their own (Hypothesis 1).
Furthermore, the findings of this interaction show that if
people perceive the authority to be biased, procedural
accuracy does not exert any influence whatsoever. In
contrast, when the authority is perceived as unbiased,
people attend to the accuracy of the procedure enacted
(Hypothesis 2). These results are important for a variety
of reasons. First, it is the first causal demonstration—at
least, to my knowledge—of how key procedural rules
combine in predicting procedural justice evaluations,
perceptions of trustworthiness, and positive emotions.
Second, it demonstrates how an initial procedure such
as bias can direct people’s attention to other procedural
justice information. If people realize that the authority is
biased, no more importance will be assigned to the pre-
ceding procedural justice information, whereas this will
be the case when the authority is perceived as unbiased.
Thus, the present research provides useful information
concerning the combined effects of two important, but
hardly examined, procedural components in relation-
ship to judgments and emotional measures.
Another interesting finding was that both studies
demonstrated that this interaction was mediated by per-
ceptions of trustworthiness (Hypothesis 3). Indeed, both
procedural justice perceptions and emotional reactions
were explained, at least partly, in terms of trustworthi-
ness. This observation aligns well with findings that trust-
worthiness may act as a substitute of procedural justice
(e.g., Van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998) and the obser-
vation that reactions toward violations of justice are
strongly emotional (see Bies & Tripp, 1996). Moreover,
these finding are in line with the assumption that people
care about the benevolence of the authority and that
they therefore assign much weight to how neutral the
authority acts (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Or, in other words,
Tyler and Degoey (1996) state, “trustworthiness is pri-
marily determined by neutral and unbiased decision
making” (p. 342).
As a matter of fact, the identification of this mediating
variable is important for a variety of reasons. First, to
date, only a few empirical studies have been able to dem-
onstrate that perceptions of trustworthiness are in some
way associated with how procedural justice operates
(see, for an exception, Brockner, Siegel, Daly, Tyler, &
Martin, 1997). More specifically, a recent meta-analysis
by Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) noted that “pro-
cedural justice means that the organization acts fairly as
a rule and hence can be trusted. This prediction, how-
ever, is not supported by our findings” (pp. 306-307).
Second, research on authorities and procedural justice
has been criticized for providing little information about
the possible mechanisms through which leader behavior
and procedures influence subordinates (e.g., Cohen-
Charash & Spector, 2001; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine,
& Bachrach, 2000). The finding that perceptions of
trustworthiness mediated the interactive effect of bias
and accuracy thus is a step forward in uncovering the
process through which leader’s procedures affect peo-
ple’s reactions.
It is also noteworthy that across two studies significant
effects on emotional reactions were found. Including
emotional measures to understand the psychology of
procedural justice is important at least for two reasons.
First, recently a strong plea has been made for justice
researchers to leave their cognitive mode of thinking
and to start including people’s emotional experiences to
explain people’s reactions toward (in)justices more
accurately (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 2002; Brief, 2001). Due to
the fact that consensus now exists that the fairness of pro-
cedures is one of the major issues that people within
groups and organizations are concerned about (Tyler &
Smith, 1998)—significantly influencing a variety of reac-
tions such as group identification, organizational com-
mitment, cooperation, organizational citizenship be-
havior, and so forth—researchers interested in the
psychology of procedural justice are particularly advised
to pay attention to the role of emotions.
Second, and on a related note, although the role of
emotions is very much present in social justice theories
(e.g., equity and relative deprivation theory) (Adams,
1965), most procedural justice research has neglected
this response variable (Mikula et al., 1998). This neglect
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is worrying for the development of our justice theories
because emotional reactions are generally considered to
play an important role in translating rather objective
instances such as procedures into its own subjective judg-
ments and perceptions or, in other words, emotions may
be helpful to more fully understand why justice is consid-
ered to be in the eye of the beholder. Furthermore, the
limited number of justice studies that have included
emotions focused mainly on negative emotions, whereas
as we argued in our introduction, research on the expe-
rience of positive emotions is badly needed (cf. Watson
et al., 1988). Acknowledging the finding from relation-
ship research that positive affect is experienced more
when relationships are enjoyable and reliable (e.g.,
Baumeister & Leary, 1995) also adds to the present claim
that positive emotions need to be included to study the
positive effects of using fair procedures.
Furthermore, the present research also yields addi-
tional evidence for the proposition that bias and accu-
racy are important instances of procedural rules (e.g.,
Leventhal, 1980). Leventhal’s six justice criteria were
based on a theoretical analysis of the literature and as
such were in need of empirical validation. To date, how-
ever, research efforts in this direction have been very
scarce. Indeed, in their meta-analysis, Cohen-Charash
and Spector (2001) pointed out that “although we have
enough data on some aspects of organizational prac-
tices (e.g., voice), we do not have enough data on other
aspects of organizational practices, such as correctability
and representativeness” (p. 308). In addition, I would
like to emphasize again that this type of research also
should be taken one step further, that is, the possible
interactions between these procedural rules should be
looked at more closely because they may teach us which
procedures are most important and under which cir-
cumstances they may be most effective.
Another issue that deserves attention is that in the
present research, bias information was presented before
the accuracy information. In doing this, I assumed that
in many situations people already have some idea about
whether an authority is biased before they actually
encounter real procedural treatment such as (in)accu-
rate evaluations (e.g., Kurlan & Pelled, 2000). Although
this may be true from a practical point of view, one still
needs to wonder how the results might have looked if
participants would have received the accuracy informa-
tion first. Indeed, research by Van den Bos et al. (1997)
shows that people frequently base their fairness judg-
ments on the information that they receive first (see fair-
ness heuristic theory) (Lind, 2001). More specific, their
research showed that if people received outcome infor-
mation before procedural information was given, their
judgments were most influenced by outcomes rather
than procedures, whereas the opposite was true when
procedural information was given before outcome infor-
mation. Given this type of research, future research may
examine whether people would assign weight to bias
information when they are treated in an accurate or in-
accurate manner first.
Before closing, some limitations and strengths need
to be mentioned. A potential limitation is that I did not
address other frequently used dependent measures in
justice research. For example, a vast amount of research
on the relational model of authority included state self-
esteem as a primary dependent measure (e.g., Tyler,
Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler & Smith, 1999). In addi-
tion, research on prejudice or biased attitudes toward
different group members also has frequently used self-
esteem as an important indicator of how people feel
treated (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Major, Quinton, &
McCoy, 2002). Therefore, future research examining
the procedural rule of bias may include self-esteem as a
measure. Another potential limitation is that the present
research only addressed the psychology of procedures
and did not include the effects of distributive justice.
Indeed, manipulations of distributive outcomes may
interact with manipulations of procedures in determin-
ing people’s reactions. For example, people might still
experience positive emotions if they obtained positive
outcomes such as a job or promotion even though their
supervisor was known to be biased and used less than
optimally accurate procedures. Future research is
needed to test these potential interesting interactions.
An important strength, however, is that the present re-
search is the first—to my knowledge—to experimentally
examine how different procedural rules interact in
determining people’s reactions. Managers and authori-
ties use a variety of procedures; therefore, insights are
required to understand when one procedure may domi-
nate the other and if combining several procedures may
reveal stronger effects. It is my hope that future justice
research will direct more effort in this much-needed
direction of research.
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